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ALD-133        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-1402 
___________ 
 
ABIODUN IDRIS, AKA Micheal Ojogiwa, AKA Oluwahola Ademole,  
AKA Abiodun Ioris, AKA Oluwashhola Ademola, 
                                   Petitioner  
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A216 288 842) 
Immigration Judge:  John P. Ellington 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on a Motion for Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 5, 2020 
Before:  MCKEE, SHWARTZ and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: April 28, 2020) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Abiodun Idris petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”), which affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) removal order.  Because 
the petition presents no substantial question for review, we will grant the Government’s 
motion for summary action. 
Idris grew up in Lagos, Nigeria.  After traveling in Africa for two years, he entered the 
United Kingdom in 1985 and remained there for seven years.  He claimed that he entered 
the United States in 1993 on the Visa Waiver Program, using a British passport.  Idris 
was convicted on forgery charges in 1995 and 1997, and fraud in 2017, which involved 
the attempted use of a fake Nigerian passport at a bank on the University of Pennsylvania 
campus.   
The Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear, alleging that Idris was 
present in the U.S. without being admitted or paroled in violation of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  The IJ sustained the charge, but Idris applied for asylum, withholding 
of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  In his I-589 
Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal filed in April 2018, he alleged past 
persecution and fear of future persecution based on his mother’s conversion to 
Christianity and his ethnicity as a Yoruba.  A.R. 352-62.  He did not mention sexual 
orientation in the asylum application.  After later conferring with counsel, he submitted a 
personal declaration to support his application in late July 2018, detailing alleged past 
incidents of persecution based on his sexual orientation.  A.R. 284-87.   
Idris appeared pro se at a merits hearing before an IJ in August 2018.  He testified about 
two attacks by gangs in Nigeria, the treatment by his parents, and his alleged injuries.  He 
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also maintained that, although he used a U.K. passport to enter the U.S., it was false, and 
he had no legal status in the U.K.  Under questioning by the IJ, however, Idris admitted 
that he had applied for the British passport and that the government had issued it to him.  
After the hearing, the IJ made a negative credibility finding based on Idris’ testimony, 
submitted documents, and past fraudulent actions and crimes concerning his own 
identity.  A.R. 67.  The IJ denied Idris’ asylum application as untimely, and all other 
applications for relief based on the adverse credibility determination, and ordered him 
removed to the U.K., and, in the alternative, Nigeria.  A.R. 71. 
In his counseled appeal to the BIA, Idris abandoned his asylum and CAT claims and 
focused on the withholding of removal claim, arguing that the IJ did not make a sufficient 
finding on whether Idris had a clear probability of future persecution in Nigeria.  He also 
argued that the IJ’s designation of the U.K. as the primary country of removal constituted 
clear error.  The BIA dismissed the appeal, and Idris filed a pro se petition for review.  
After he filed his opening brief, the Government filed a motion for summary action and 
the briefing schedule was stayed. 
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  We review the BIA’s decision and consider 
the IJ’s decision to the extent that the BIA deferred to it.  See Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 
F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012).  We agree with the Government that this petition presents 
no substantial question for review. 
We lack jurisdiction to consider the agency’s denial of asylum and protection under the 
CAT, as Idris failed to exhaust administrative remedies for those claims.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
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1252(d)(1); Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 245 n.8 (3d Cir. 2004).1  Although Idris did 
not challenge the adverse credibility determination in his BIA appeal, we could review 
that issue, as the BIA considered it.  See Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 126 (3d Cir. 
2008).   
Idris did not expressly challenge the adverse credibility finding in his brief here, either, 
and the Government urges us to find that consideration of the issue is waived.  See Voci 
v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 609 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005).  While the Government’s point is well 
taken, even if we review the issue we cannot find a compelling basis for disagreeing with 
the credibility analysis offered by the agency.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  The BIA 
homed in on the IJ’s finding that Idris failed to include sexual orientation as a ground of 
persecution in his asylum application.  The BIA characterized this as a “critical 
omission,” A.R. 4, and we agree.  Idris’ sexual orientation, and the attacks and injuries 
sustained from it, formed the centerpiece of his persecution claims (in fact, he ultimately 
abandoned the religious and ethnic grounds on appeal to the BIA).  Coupled with the 
material inconsistencies and omissions highlighted in the IJ’s decision, and Idris’ 
criminal convictions for forgery and fraud and his many aliases, the adverse credibility 
finding is supported by substantial evidence.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also 
Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (noting that contradictory 
evidence, inconsistent statements, and inherently implausible testimony may support an 
adverse determination); Mocevic v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 2008) 
 
1 We similarly lack jurisdiction to review Idris’ claims that he has mental health issues, as 
he did not raise that claim before the agency. 
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(affirming adverse credibility finding in which criminal conviction, involving “stealing 
and not being truthful,” undermined credibility). 
Finally, we agree with the Government that Idris’ argument that the IJ erred in finding 
that he is a national of the United Kingdom is moot, given Idris’ removal to Nigeria in 
December last year. 
For all these reasons, we grant the Government’s motion for summary action and will 
deny the petition for review.  To the extent that Idris seeks release from confinement or a 
stay of removal, those requests are denied as moot.   
